1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
brought by US shareholders in Argentinean gas transportation and distribution companies which had suffered economic losses as a result of measures introduced by the Government during the severe economic crisis of the early 2000s. The said measures effectively dismantled the favourable regulatory framework that had been created by the Argentine Government in the early 1990s to attract foreign investment in the gas transportation and distribution sector.
In all cases, Argentina's measures were found to be in breach of its BIT obligations.
Argentina raised the "state of necessity" defence under both customary international law and the BIT arguing that, in the circumstances of the economic emergency, its measures had been necessary to maintain public order and protect the essential interests of the State. While in CMS, Enron and Sempra Energy, the tribunals rejected the necessity of Argentina's measures for not cumulatively meeting all the required conditions set by customary international law, the defence was allowed in the LG&E case under both the BIT and customary law.
The relevant point for this analysis is what effect the acceptance of the necessity defence has on the award of compensation. At this point in time, this question does not have a clear-cut answer; the law on this matter is unsettled. The answer may depend on whether the necessity defence is invoked under customary international law or under an investment treaty. Customary international law is discussed first (Section II); treaty regimes, using the Argentina-US BIT as an example, are examined next (Section III). Additional considerations addressing a number of relevant points (Section IV) are followed by conclusions (Section V).
II. Customary International Law
Under customary international law, the state of necessity (and other circumstances precluding wrongfulness) does not annul or terminate the international obligation concerned; rather it provides a justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in question subsists. 5 The ICJ pointed out in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros The formulation adopted in ILC Article 27 on the matter of compensation is soft -"without prejudice […] to the question of compensation". There is no explicit requirement to provide compensation in all circumstances; rather, compensation is not excluded automatically, even though the act in question ceases to be wrongful.
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In principle, an obligation to pay compensation for the damage caused by lawful acts is not alien to the international law of foreign investment. The prime example is expropriation, which, even if effected for a public purpose (i.e., similar to necessity, in pursuit of State interest), invariably entails a payment of compensation. Even though not fully settled, international law is clear that lawful expropriation should be accompanied by the payment of compensation, usually equivalent to the market value of the assets taken. International law on compensation for the damage caused under the circumstances precluding wrongfulness is much farther from being settled.
Uncertainty Created by the ILC's Lack of Clarity
The soft, non-mandatory character of Article 27 was emphasized in the CMS Annulment Decision and in the LG&E Award. 10 The LG&E Tribunal observed that the Article was not specific on whether any compensation was payable to the party affected by losses, on the kind of losses that could be compensated for, and on the circumstances in which compensation should be payable.
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In its commentaries to Article 27, the ILC specified that the term "compensation" carried a special connotation in this provision, and was different from compensation as a form of reparation for internationally wrongful acts. conduct that is excusable in terms of both the specific criteria triggering compensation and the appropriate measure and extent of compensation.
Determinant factor for the question of compensation
In the Commentaries, the ILC noted that there exists a "possibility of compensation in certain cases" but "it is not possible to specify in general terms when compensation is payable". 14 The ILC attributed its lack of precision to the fact that "the range of possible situations covered by chapter V is such that to lay down a detailed regime for compensation is not appropriate".
15 12 Commentary to ILC Article 27, para.4.
13 One other interpretation could be that the right to compensation is simply suspended for the duration of the state of necessity, but would be revived thereafter. In reality, however, given the relatively short emergency periods and prolonged dispute settlement procedures, this temporary suspension of the obligation to compensate would not have any practical value for responsible States. 14 Commentary to ILC Article 27, para.1.
Regarding the criteria to distinguish between situations where compensation is due and situations where it is not, it follows from ILC's preparatory works that the distinction should depend on whether it would be legitimate to allow a State "to shift the burden of the defence of its own interests or concerns on to an innocent third State". 16 Under this approach, it appears that when the third State is indeed innocent, it must not bear the burden of the State acting in protection of its own interests, and thus compensation should be provided. Conversely, if a third State had a role to play in the creation of a problematic situation, then there is no room for compensation.
On this basis it was suggested that there should be no compensation in cases where the circumstances of self-defence or countermeasures are invoked, "since those circumstances depend upon and relate to prior wrongful conduct of the 'target' State, and there is no basis to compensate it for the consequences of its own wrongful conduct". 17 At the same time, it was noted that "there is a strong case for compensation for actual loss where a State relies on necessity, provided at least that the other State has not itself through its own default or neglect produced the situation of necessity". 18 The same conclusion was reached in relation to distress.
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Investment tribunals have also recognized that the task of appropriate apportionment of the burden of loss plays an important, perhaps determinative, role in deciding the question of compensation. Thus, the CMS Tribunal stated that it would be contrary to the treaty if one party, or its subjects, were to "bear entirely the cost of the plea of the It is also indicative that even in cases where the necessity was not accepted, the tribunals still reduced compensation on account of Argentina's economic crisis, thereby distributed the loss between the parties. Specifically, the CMS Tribunal noted that while it would be wholly unjustifiable to put all the costs of the crisis on the claimant, the claimant could not be entirely beyond the reach of the abnormal conditions prompted by the crisis. 22 In the Tribunal's view, some of the negative impacts should be attributed to the business risk borne by CMS when investing in
Argentina. The Tribunal said that both parties should be "sharing some of the costs of the crisis in a reasonable manner", otherwise the arbitral award could "amount to an insurance policy against business risk". 23 Specifically, the adverse economic circumstances were taken into account in determining the market value of the shares using discounted cash flow analysis (DCF).
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Similarly, the Enron Tribunal noted that "just as it is not reasonable for the licensees to bear the entire burden of such changed reality neither would it be reasonable for them to believe that nothing happened in Argentina since the License was approved". 25 The Enron Tribunal also made downward adjustments in its DCF valuation of the investment to "reflect the reality of the crisis" as compared to a "normal business scenario". 26 The Tribunal in Sempra Energy followed the route of CMS and Enron in this respect.
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Agreement between the parties concerned 21 LG&E v Argentina, Decision 
III. Treaty Regimes
Some investment treaties contain clauses that resemble the necessity defence under customary law. Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT, considered in a number of investment disputes, will be used as an example in this analysis. Additionally, another type of treaty clause, sometimes referred to as an "armed conflict clause" is reviewed below.
A. Treaty Necessity Clauses
Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT provides:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.
It is disputed whether the provisions of this kind are on the same footing with the rules on necessity under customary international law, and whether the consequences of their successful invocation are the same as under customary law.
No compensation?
The Article XI, if and for so long as it applied, excluded the operation of the substantive provisions of the BIT. That being so, there could be no possibility of compensation being payable during that period.
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It appears that the Committee treated Article XI as a stand-alone provision sufficient in its content to resolve the question of compensation, without resorting to customary international law.
The earlier LG&E award falls in line with the Annulment Committee's approach. The
LG&E 
Or compensation determined by customary law?
The Sempra Energy award, issued only three days after the CMS Annulment Decision, does not seem to share the latter's approach. The Sempra Energy Tribunal, after engaging in a rather detailed analysis of the relationship between Article XI of the BIT and ILC Article 25, held that because Article XI of the Treaty did not determine the precise conditions of its application, rules of customary law had to be applied as a subsidiary source of law:
[T]he Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as the definition of necessity and the conditions for its operation are concerned, given that it is under customary law that such elements have been defined.
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The Tribunal said it did not "believe that because Article XI did not make an express reference to customary law, this source of rights and obligations [became] the consequences of its application, these would also have to be determined under customary international law.
The Award in Sempra Energy, which implies that ILC Article 27 would govern the award of compensation regardless of whether the necessity defence is invoked under the BIT or under customary law, is thus in contradiction with the CMS Annulment Decision, which would reject the obligation to pay compensation if the necessity defence is accepted under the BIT.
Even in the absence of stare decisis in the ICSID system, the decision of the ICSID Annulment Committee is bound to have an important influence on future arbitrations.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen which view will prevail.
B. "Armed Conflict" Clauses
Under the rubric of necessity, a separate type of clause found in many BITs has been discussed. The clauses of this type concern compensation for losses suffered in the circumstances of armed conflicts, riots, insurrection, as well as "state of national Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses." (emphasis added) Significantly, however, this provision must be considered not in isolation, but in conjunction with other obligations of States under international law. As discussed above, customary international law does not automatically exclude compensation, while treaty necessity clauses may be understood to have this effect. Inconclusive as it is, the law still implies that compensation may be due in certain circumstances.
Notably, the "armed conflict" provisions do not add to, or detract from, the right to compensation for losses; they merely guarantee a foreign investor from a particular country that the treatment it will receive in terms of compensation for such losses will not be less favourable than that accorded by the host State to its own nationals or to foreign investors from other countries. (2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals or companies of one Contracting Party who in any of the situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in the territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from: (a) requisitioning of their property by its forces of authorities, or (b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities, which was not caused in combat action or was not required by the necessity of the situation, shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation. Resulting payments shall be freely transferable. 
IV. Additional Considerations

Legal basis of necessity
The emerging jurisprudence suggests that the question of compensation depends on the applicable law that serves as a basis for invoking the necessity defence. If it is successfully invoked under a treaty clause similar to Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT, the claim for compensation is likely to be rejected, even though this matter has not been fully settled. Under customary international law, however, compensation is not excluded. Questions relating to specific circumstances which require payment of compensation as well as the extent of such compensation still await clarification, and at this point only some limited thoughts may be offered.
Who is to bear the losses?
A review of the relevant awards shows that in the final analysis, the deliberations have centered on the question of who was to bear the negative economic consequences of the crisis and the measure(s) adopted by a State to rectify the emergency situation. To recall, the rationale, identified by the ILC for requiring compensation in cases of "necessity", is that it would be unfair to shift the burden of losses from a State pursuing its own essential interests on to an innocent third State. Not disputing this basic rationale, it appears, however, that the doctrine of an "innocent third State" cannot be applied automatically in cases concerning foreign investments. In these cases, investors of the "third State" concerned are not innocent by-standers, who happened to suffer damages as a matter of pure contingency.
When making a decision to invest in a particular country, investors are, or must be, aware of the risks of investing in the country, including the dangers of political or economic instability. The decision to invest in a less stable country is a conscious and carefully considered one, taken as a result of balancing the promise of higher returns (compared to more stable countries) and higher risks inherent in the investment.
Therefore, it is appropriate to attribute at least part of the damage to the investment risk, when this risk materializes during the state of necessity. These considerations should play a part in deliberations on distribution of the burden of loss incurred under relevant circumstances.
Modalities of sharing losses
The reviewed cases show that there is more than one modality of sharing the burden of losses. Even though the defence of necessity failed the test in CMS, Enron and Sempra Energy and survived in LG&E, in each of the awards, the tribunals took into account the circumstances of the economic crisis in calculating the damages. In
LG&E, having accepted the necessity defence, the Tribunal exempted the State from paying compensation for the losses incurred during the period of the crisis. In CMS,
Enron and Sempra Energy even though the respective tribunals did not exempt the Respondent from its liability during the period of the emergency, they did take into account the economic impact of the crisis when calculating the amount of compensation. All the tribunals thus sought to distribute, albeit to differing extents, the burden of losses between the host State and the foreign investors concerned.
It would be interesting to compare the numerical results achieved under each of the two modalities of accounting for the crisis circumstances (one used in LG&E, and the other in CMS, Enron and Sempra Energy) and to assess which of them is more beneficial to a particular disputing party. However, this is impossible to do with precision, mainly because the tribunals took different basic approaches to measuring compensation -the CMS, Enron and Sempra Energy tribunals looked at the difference in the value of claimants' shares with and without the breaches, while the LG&E Tribunal used, as a measure of compensation, dividends not received by the Claimants during the time of the breach. Potentially, however, the LG&E method would leave
States better off, especially where the length of the recognized period of necessity (and thus the period of the exemption from liability) is considerable. In fact, under the
LG&E approach, a State would be fully absolved from liability if the measures at issue are taken after the commencement of the period of necessity and revoked at the end of this period.
Impact of the nature of damage
The nature of the damage may also make a difference in choosing the appropriate approach. For example, if a measure taken during the period of necessity leads to an instant loss of the entire investment (like in case of an outright abolition of certain business activity), compensation (possibly partial, for example not based on future profits) may be appropriate in order to spread the loss between the foreign investor and the State in a balanced manner. On the other hand, if as a result of a continuing breach, the damage is being inflicted gradually and spread in time, some of it occurring during the period of necessity and some outside this period, like the situation in LG&E, then the balanced distribution of the burden of negative economic consequences can be achieved by awarding no compensation for the damage suffered during the period of necessity but by compensating for all other damage.
The question of interest
The function of interest is to compensate an aggrieved party for the inability to invest, and receive income on, the amount of compensation that has not been paid to it in time. It follows that, generally, interest should run from the moment compensation is due until the compensation is paid. In expropriation cases, interest starts running from the date of expropriation; in cases of treaty breaches, it starts running from the date of the breach. On this basis, even if one adopts the pro-investor approach that the obligation to pay compensation is not terminated but merely suspended during the period of necessity, interest should stop running for this period and resume once it is over.
Obviously, under the approach where no compensation is awarded for the losses suffered during the period of necessity, the question of interest does not arise. Lastly, in a scenario where damage is incurred gradually, starting before the period of necessity and continuing after this period is over (like the situation in LG&E), interest on the "before" damage should run throughout the period of necessity because as a matter of law, compensation for that damage was due at the time of the breach. 
V. Conclusions
Customary international law, as reflected in the ILC Articles, does not offer a determinative solution to the question of compensation in cases where the defence of necessity is successfully invoked, leaving a large degree of flexibility and discretion to tribunals that will have to continue struggling with the uncertainty of the law. The case law available to date, scarce as it is, suggests that one may logically substantiate divergent approaches, from full compensation to no compensation for relevant losses.
There is a general underlying objective to distribute equitably between the disputing parties the burden of the losses incurred during emergency situations. The case law also demonstrates that a country's circumstances may be taken into account to reduce compensation even where the necessity defence is rejected.
The necessity-type provisions of investment treaties, if interpreted as stand-alone and not requiring subsidiary application of customary international law, are likely to result in no compensation for the damages suffered during the recognized period of necessity. The contrary interpretation would mean that compensation should be determined under the rules of customary law. In light of the CMS Annulment Decision and given the uncertainty of customary law on the matter, the former interpretation will probably prevail.
Overall, in the absence of sufficient clarity of the law, arbitrators will inevitably base their decisions on what they see as equitable and reasonable in the circumstances of a particular case. On the one hand, this increases chances that the outcomes of disputes will be balanced but, on the other, makes these outcomes rather difficult to predict, prompting States to further clarify their respective obligations in investment treaties.
the state of necessity). This approach appears to be over-compensating because in a no-breach scenario, the dividends would be received by the Claimants periodically, once in a year, rather than at once on 18
